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Abstract 
This paper opens with a critical analysis of a paradox in contemporary educational 
research in and about Confucian Heritage Culture (CHC): The assumption that 
national boundaries coincide with that of a distinct and homogeneous culture, which 
consistently renders rather homogenous set of educational phenomena, collides against 
a more widely accepted discourse—culture transcends geographical frontiers and is 
ever evolving in character. It is claimed that this paradox is due to the fact that a thin 
conception of CHC competes neck to neck with a thick conception of it. This paper also 
addresses the possibility of an ad hoc education research methodology in and about 
CHC and its compliance issues regarding the mainstream Western research dynamics 
and philosophy of science. Confucian elements relevant to CHC research rationale are 
discussed to argue that first, a research is inextricably a moral act insofar free actors are 
involved in it, second, most sui generis methodological problems attached to CHC 
occur in the sphere of ethics and, third, a research methodology that takes into account 
phenomenographic variation could be the best suited to ease emic-etic tensions 
inherent to CHC-based research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For long time, educationalists have speculated on the role of culture in education 
leaving no stone unturned. Whitehead (1967) could never have suspected that one day 
mathematics education, his paradigm for ‘specialized knowledge’ as distinct from 
‘cultural knowledge’ will also be a subject matter for cultural inquiry (Ref. Bishop, 
1988). The related literature is abundant and often incongruous, for instance, education 
as instrument of cultural struggle and social reproduction (Freire, 1972; Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1977) versus culture as the principal due and goal of education since it should 
usher the young to understand and live in it (Bruner, 1996). Emerging situated and 
contextual discourses in education treats culture as one of the most prototypical 
contexts that permeates all other domains and it is per se an independent area of 
research or unit of analysis. Also termed in plural, Confucian Heritage Culture (CHC) 
is described by education research communities as a group of Asian nation-states with 
their motherland and overseas population who share Confucian values, which 
consistently reflect in social behaviour and practices, including academic outcomes and 
learning approaches (Biggs, Watkins, Comparative Education Research Centre., & 
Australian Council for Educational Research., 1996; Chan, Rao, & Comparative 
Education Research Centre., 2009; Li, 2003; Tweed & Lehman, 2002; Watkins, Reghi, 
& Astilla, 1991). Despite its relatively short trajectory, CHC discourse has produced 
fruitful academic discussions. One such argument has been on the Western 
misperception of education in CHC partly due to their dichotomous research paradigms 
that are inappropriate for research in and about (Biggs, et al., 1996; Chan, et al., 2009; 
Watkins, et al., 1991). It posts a valid concern on whether CHC-based researches can or 
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should have a distinct process of inquiry, which calls for critical analysis. I put to fore a 
theoretical analysis on the possibility of an Asian education research methodology and 
conjecture what kind of conditions such a methodology should meet if it were to 
produce plausible and fruitful researches, and not misinterpretation-prone, 
methodologically troubling or of dubious validity.  
The present analysis could be considered as more heretical than critical. As an 
ethnic Korean who has always been exposed to one of the strictest Confucianism in Asia, 
I am an insider in CHC, yet by training, academic interests and more years of living in 
overseas diaspora communities, I take an outsider stance. This disagreeing cultural 
exposure could be both weakness and strength of this paper.    
 
 
Confucian Heritage Culture, thin and thick 
 
Although not all CHC educational researches are cross-cultural or international 
comparative education researches, they share some common methodological concerns. 
Either refers to the impact of cultural nuances on multiple domains and calls for 
caution when a methodology is applied cross-culturally. According to Mason (2007), 
the difficulties associated with cross-culturally applied methodology can be 
summarized as: (1) the misleading modern construe of ‘national cultures’; (2) 
ethnography usually contains phenomenological data from actors, participants and 
researcher, with almost no heed to neo-Marxian sort of socio-political critique; (3) 
ethnographic researches seldom offer the perspective of ‘cultural outsiders’ (LeVine, 
1966); and (4) ahistorical-ness of ethnography in general.  
‘National cultures’ construe relies on an assumption that national boundaries1 
coincide with that of a distinct and homogeneous culture that renders a rather 
homogenous score of phenomena unique to education, which collides against a more 
widely accepted discourse that culture transcends nation-state frontiers and is ever 
evolving in character. CHC has evolved is evolving and always immersed in a context, 
that is, situated in space, time, history and social structures. Hence, Japanese CHC 
before and after the Meiji ishin are different; post-World War II Japanese CHC 
contrasts with Korean CHC suffering consequences of the Treaty of Versailles under 
Japanese colonialism. These two in turn are different from Chinese CHC before and 
after the May Fourth movement and the Cultural Revolution of Mao that tried to wipe 
off Confucianism.  
The ways how CHC was introduced and assimilated in different Asian regions 
are equally heterogeneous. The Korean version of Chinese civil examination was 
introduced during 10th Century Koryo to be definitely abolished during the Gap-oh 
reform (1894) of late Chosen, which coincided with the end of formal religion-like 
Confucianism or Yu-kyo (儒敎 Confucian religion/code), a term that prevailed in 
Chosen Korea over its original Chinese Yu-ga (儒家 Confucian school) or Yu-hak (儒學 
Confucian study). In Japan, kami and buddhas were replaced by Confucianism during 
Muromachi period (1333-1568) when people became more this-worldly than afterlife-
concerned transcendentalists (Ama, 2005). It would be incorrect, however, to regard 
kata (型 form) that have pervaded all walks and aspects of Japanese life, from trade to 
suicide code (De Mente, 2005), as totally CHC. Indeed, Confucian share in Japanese 
shikata (way of doing things) is open to discussion. Moreover, inside a kingdom or 
region reputed as CHC, non-Confucian minorities have coexisted with their unique 
ways of organizing and leading life, continuously generating self-imageries and 
stereotypes. Some of these social imageries were not Confucian at all, such as the 
Uyghurs and Dungans in the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Kazakh borderlands. In some other cases, 
an opposite phenomenon of entrenchment occurred, such as the case of ‘deep-seated’ 
                                            
1 In his seminal work, David Ho listed only Far East Asian nations, namely China, Japan and 
Korea and oversea minorities such as Chinese-American (Ho, 1994, p. 286) 
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educational values of Korean ethnic minority in Chinese Jilin province (Gao, 2010). 
These facts corroborate the hypothesis of an acculturation process (Berry, 2003), 
namely ‘de-Confucianization’ (Rozman, 2002) of some CHC elements, whilst some 
others have remained rather stable in time, place, history and social structures. I call 
them respectively a thin CHC discourse and a thick CHC discourse, not as two poles for 
a snapshot analysis but as either shore of a flowing river for a contextual analysis. A 
thin CHC discourse as argued here is a socially constructed unity, an evolving category, 
hence always situationally specific (cf. Lowe, 1996, p. 82) and bears lighter forms of 
Confucian cultural values with only meagre to modest resemblance to classic 
Confucianism. A thick CHC discourse, on the other hand, meets the following three 
principles: 
  
It should uphold some clearly distinct Confucian elements such as tao (道 way), jen 
(仁 humanity) or li (禮 rite, social ceremonials and conventions)  
These elements should exist across more than one geographical regions and 
borders, to ensure that they are not folktales 
These elements can be traced back to textual Classics of Confucius or widely 
recognized Confucian schools 
 
Let me illustrate the foregoing with a case of thick CHC discourse. David Ho (1994) 
suggests that certain Confucian values can explain cognitive socialization of Asian 
students in America, namely a family-based cognitive conservatism. He argues that 
much of education achievement of CHC students has its root in an authoritarian 
moralism and collectivism that can be called as parental conservatism. Confucian filial 
piety is, he claims, the origin of cognitive socialization (chiefly parental conservatism) 
of CHC students and this fact could decode the paradoxes surrounding CHC learners (p. 
302). Ho’s research work fulfils the criteria for a thick CHC discourse: Asian people in 
several regions and areas share a distinct Confucian element, i.e., hsiao (孝 piety), 
which is textually Confucian. What he does not mention though is the fact that ‘filial 
piety’ was a later development in China. In the original text of The Analects of 
Confucius, hsiao appears linked to the concept of jen (cf. Waley & Confucius, 1938, pp. 
38-39). Hsiao’s connection to socio-political paternalism was constructed roughly three 
to four centuries after the death of Confucius. The association between hsiao and the 
collective sphere occurred in China during Han dynasty when rulers instrumentalized 
CHC for socio-political stability (Liu, 1998). Many elements of Korean CHC were also 
turned into political tools by the kings of Koryo dynasty (918-1392), but it was in 
Chosun dynasty (1392-1910), especially 1650 onwards, that Confucianism became both 
the political system and a quasi religion dictating a class-based apartheid, arranged 
marriages between clans and filial piety (only father-son) over conjugal affinity as the 
basis of family structure (Park & Cho, 1995). Japanese CHC took a non-Confucian-like 
turn clashing against Buddhism during Tokugawa period when “being intellectual 
meant being a Confucian [and in] order to be a good Confucian, one had to avoid other 
religions; Buddhism was thus never accepted”(Ama, 2005, p. 21). Elements of such 
politicised CHC are, of course, present in our days. Liu Shuxan summarized thus the 
end-result of the foregoing metamorphosis of CHC and as compared with the West: 
 
It is...not true to say that the Confucian tradition does not value the individual, as 
everything must start with the individual. What is lacking is the kind of rugged 
individualism of the West. Everyone is conscious of a strong sense of responsibility to 
society; there is no dichotomy between the individual and the society, or the internal 
and the external. (1998, p. 59) 
 
A thin CHC discourse in contemporary education and social science research diverge 
from classic Confucianism. Hofstede’s famous ‘Confucian dynamism’ (1991) argues that 
it is possible to identify a long-term orientation and a short-term orientation of Chinese 
people’s social motivation, behaviour and action. His sociology upholds that when 
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Confucian heritage people foster virtues they are aiming at rewards and ‘Confucian 
dynamism’ is a ‘dimension of national cultures’. There are other analogous thin 
discourses with the common assumption that national boundaries can encapsulate all 
cultural nuances of CHC such as ‘chopstick cultures’ and ‘chopstick area’ (Funabashi, 
1993).  
A repercussion of this semantic ambivalence in educational research is that a 
thin and a thick CHC discourses coexist side by side in a same research field, in the 
same body of work of a researcher, in a same book chapter and article.  
 
 
Methodological Issues in CHC-based Research 
 
The main discussion on CHC-based educational research and the possibility of an 
‘Asian education research methodology’ is on research dynamics. By research dynamics, 
I mean the research rationale and ensuing action, that is, from deciding a unit of 
inquiry through choice of research framework to fieldwork and analysis.  
A research framework comprises a conceptual component and an outlook, a 
body of a pre-existing theory or its modified version, also called naively as paradigm, 
which provides the researcher with an epistemic coherence throughout all the stages of 
an inquiry. In my view, this and equivalent Western research dynamics and their basic 
rationale are sine qua non conditions to which any CHC-based educational inquiries 
should pledge. Indeed, CHC-based researchers have no other option but to comply with 
any of time-honoured ‘Western methodologies’ because only by doing so their work 
could get recognition both intra-culturally and trans-culturally. If their researches are 
to deserve any attention, they should also make sense to, say, Central Asian, African 
and Latin-American heritage cultures and world research community at large. No one 
can take lightly Polanyi’s principle of mutual control, “simple fact that scientists keep 
watch over each other” (1983, p. 72). If Western misconceptions on CHC and Eastern 
difficulties to project contextually sensitive self-imageries to the West were real, they 
would be due to a Western naturalistic coherence’s pretence of universalism and its 
forgetfulness to take into account cultural variations and, Eastern inability to deliver a 
substantive and convincing discourse. The common fault of either side is an insufficient 
understanding of cultural variables. Jin Li argues, for example, that a “continual 
reliance of researchers on Western concepts without considering indigenous or emic 
cultural meanings and their psychological manifestations” (Li, 2009, p. 42). She adds 
other three predicaments: (1) dichotomous conceptual frameworks of the West (2) 
dominant Western individualistic and culture-free anthropological assumptions (3) 
understanding education univocally as a means to social mobility.  
These predicaments, however, do not seem to be exclusive of the West. Asian 
researchers of both Asian and Western backgrounds do not seem to be especially 
immune as many of them were trained either in the West or in heavily ‘Westernized’ 
academic environments in Asia. Moreover, even those who were not, won’t be able to 
break free from Western philosophies of science, professional ethos and fora, all of 
which, to be straightforward, converge in to the prevailing Western Anglo scholarly 
publication bottleneck. This is not to say that these researches have less validity but, 
rather, to say that they usually use the same dichotomous conceptual frameworks when 
finger pointing ‘Western misunderstandings’. The empirical research series on the 
“Paradox of the Chinese Learner” by Biggs and Watkins is an example (cf. Biggs, et al., 
1996) (Watkins, Biggs, & Comparative Education Research Centre., 2001). If the CHC 
discourse were a malaise, then it would be a global pandemic affecting both the West 
and the East.  
In order to analyse critical areas of CHC-based research methodology when 
complying Western research requirements, I choose Karl Popper’s tetradic schema for 
knowledge growth. It is preferred over Baconian inductive models because first, not all 
CHC educational research methodologies must be inductive, such as research on art 
critiquing education that uses a deductive method—general aesthetic notions allow 
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interpretation of particular cases (Eisner, 1985) and, second, because it is a research 
model that can put to rest the preoccupation and ambition for total generalization and 
total prediction that still haunt some educational research circles. Popper sketched his 
schema like this (1963): 
 
 
P1 --> TT1--> EE1 --> P2 -->  ∞ 
 
In plain language, a researcher finds an intriguing problem (P1); to solve it s/he tries 
out a first tentative theory (TT1), after which, errors are eliminated (EE1) to become 
aware of an ensuing problem (P2). This unending process known as falsification is 
ultimately an ‘ever discard errors’ or ‘problem solving by trial and error’ heuristics—the 
quintessence of Popper’s philosophy of science, epistemology and social theory. 
 
I now expand the preceding to pinpoint how ethical issues and methodological 
issues overlap in a research. 
The act of singling out a research problem (P1) from hundreds on the phenomenological 
horizon of researcher depends on the exercise of researcher’s freedom and choice. 
Bewilderment or sense of wonder2 is the initial lead to his/her choice of one or more 
research problems, followed by an act of assigning a subjective relevance and category 
to each. The act of choosing and delimiting a research problem while dismissing all 
others, and not changing it lightly without having it tested, implies a free and rational 
agent and his/her moral act. Ethical-methodological problems are already apparent at 
this stage, for example, turning research participants into a ‘case’ or a ‘research 
problem’, i.e., the risk of ‘problematizing’ or ‘pathologizing’ them (Nind, Benjamin, 
Sheehy, Collins, & Hall, 2004). In a broad sense, the entire CHC discourse is about 
‘problematizing’ Asian children by categorizing them (e.g., deep or superficial learner) 
following researcher’s mental rubric. At the very start of the research, a process of 
‘cultural invasion’ and disruption of li that pervades all aspects of life in CHC societies 
could take place. “Rite brings out forcefully not only the harmony and beauty of social 
forms, the inherent and ultimate dignity of human intercourse; it brings out also the 
moral perfection implicit in achieving one’s ends by dealing with others as beings of 
equal dignity, as free coparticipants in li ” (Fingarette, 1972, p. 16).  
There is more than one tentative theory (TT) or methodology available to the 
researcher. Is s/he completely free to choose any? Popper’s answer is surprisingly 
illiberal. He says that the fittest theory should be chosen. The predicament here is that 
all available theories are in the still-to-be-tested stage and no test result is known, and 
there can be neither inner certainty nor outer justification for its adequacy. At this 
point, Popper’s argument takes a subtle turn: “the testing of a theory depends upon 
basic statements whose acceptance or rejection, in its turn, depends upon our decisions. 
Thus, it is decisions which settle the fate of theories” (Popper, 1959, p. 108). The type of 
decision he is referring to is a free decision:  
 
With the conventionalist I hold that choice of any particular theory is an act, a practical 
matter...I differ from positivist in holding that basic statements are not justifiable by 
our immediate experiences, but are, from logical point of view, accepted by an act, a 
free decision. (Popper, 1959, p. 109) 
 
Researcher’s freedom plays a key role in the choice of a theoretical framework and, not 
only that, freedom is the ultimate justification of why a researcher chooses a theoretical 
                                            
2 The beginning of inquiry is aporia, the act of marvelling. First described by Plato in his 
Socratic dialogue Theaetetus (155d) and then by Aristotle in his Metaphysics (995a24-b2), 
aporia is openness and active inclination toward truth without feeling comfortable with things 
taken for granted. 
 
 6
framework and not any other. This is not to say that the naturalistic criteria to choose a 
theoretical framework are to be neglected. By naturalistic criteria I mean something 
like, “empirical adequacy, or squaring with observational evidence, consistency, 
simplicity, comprehensiveness, explanatory unity, fecundity and learnability” (Evers & 
Lakomski, 2001, p. 503) or any other rational choice of theoretical framework 
equivalent to that of Thomas Kuhn (1977). Choice of a theoretical framework should be 
purposeful and rational, yet it ultimately depends on freedom. This is the same ground 
on which Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend together with Popper have been loosely 
tagged as irrationalists (Stove, 1982). Immanuel Kant’s dualism of freedom-moral law 
provides us with clues to understand the intriguing relationship between free decision 
and the fittest theory. His second Critique states, “freedom is indeed the ratio essendi 
of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom” (1997, p. 4). A 
vernacular reading could be: Moral law exists because of human freedom, and the 
reason why we try to know about our freedom is because there is a moral law that keeps 
our freedom in check. It also suggests mutual dependence between freedom and moral 
law on existential and epistemological grounds. Then, Kant himself defines freedom 
quite cryptically towards the end of his productive life, in a remote footnote of his 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as briefly as “pure spontaneity” (2006, 
p. 30). This is the converging point of ethical issues and methodological issues in 
research, which suggests that critical issues in research methodology occur wherever 
and whenever any moral interactions take place among research actors. As the stage of 
tentative theory testing includes research framework formulation, fieldwork, and data 
collection, it is especially rich in interpersonal relationships. Two issues might be 
especially relevant to CHC-based research. First, it is just impossible to do a CHC 
research without any ‘research biases’, or the other way around, “researchers cannot 
observe another society or culture a-theoretically” (Mason, 2007, p. 194). To some 
extent, every research framework itself is a bias. Second, with their jang (‘讓 yielding’ as 
opposed to confronting), ch’ih (‘恥 shame’ but not quite Western ‘sense of guilt for 
committed fault’), or Japanese kata as interpersonal negotiation strategies, fieldwork 
with CHC research participants could post some perplexing difficulties to Western 
research. A continuum of etiquette-ethics could silently yet critically distort the 
research process, everything from planning stage to participant’s consent through 
interview turnout and outcome, even in experimental research (cf. Brashen, 1974). 
After testing the chosen theory, research outcomes are analysed. Karl Popper 
argued that in science, knowledge is acquired by error elimination (EE), the act of 
discarding wrong hypothesis or false theories, which failed to solve the problem (or, for 
disciplines similar to sociology and education, theories that failed to upgrade 
understanding or has no better descriptive power compared with previous ones). In 
Darwinian biology, one of the favourite examples of Sir Karl, when tentative solution 
(mutation) does not work, the error elimination turns out to be fatal “for the bearer of 
the mutation, for the organism in which they occur” (Popper, 1999, p. 5). Although not 
so extreme, error elimination stage seems not less critical for educational research and 
cross-cultural comparative education inquiries in particular. Researchers face a moral 
dilemma at this later stage of research—either discarding errors together with failed 
theories or dragging them on. The dilemma is whether the researcher could recycle a 
theory that failed to solve the problem that bewildered him/her at the start of the 
research project.  
Is the field of education invulnerable to this critical view of science and 
research methodology?  Let us take a closer look. A typical education research is already 
confined to limited number of areas of inquiry (e.g., ‘assessment’ ‘administration-
policy’ or ‘language education’) where researchers are usually hijacked by their own 
specialisms for decades, even perhaps for life. Possible imagery here is that of a 
furrowed forehead scholar committed to a fixed and small set of research problems and 
frameworks replicating inbred variables (disciplines, cultures, social sectors and 
organizations), digging the same pit for life. Many of these researches will claim some 
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positive and enlightening outcome contributing to a field, or, as meta-analyst John 
Hattie has recently described, the ‘what-works-recipe’ or “theories of their own about 
what works (for them)” (2009, p. 3) in an academic world that is frantically 
publication-centred and output-dependent, and perhaps a faculty of education 
becoming a ‘faculty of publication’ (Ref. Adler & Harzing, 2009). Reality-check, self-
criticism and laments aside, whatever is the reason, the fact is that it is not common at 
all that a second and a third frameworks are tested in sequence, in the same research. 
Any attempt to reconcile forcibly the emerging data with failed hypothesis or 
theoretical framework would mean a regress for the research, if not a full-fledged 
deception. This wide-awake procrastination in eliminating errors is akrasia 3 , an 
enigma of moral philosophy, a failure in self-dominion or lack of drive (free will) to 
follow the dictates of reason or, in our case, scientific rationality.  
Popper says that after EE1 a new problem (P2) emerges (cf. Popper, 1972, p. 
288).  It seems that the term emergence is probably a misnomer here since an 
offspring-problem is not spontaneous but an ensuing version of an earlier one. What 
has fallen into researcher’s lap is then the ‘tail’ of the first cycle rather than the ‘head’ of 
the second. The same ‘tail’ is the result of the inquiry process that has just ended, 
because the researcher upheld rational and ethical rigor of scientific inquiry. The 
transformation of that ‘tail’ into the ‘head’ of the second cycle can occur if the 
researcher freely and consciously decides to take it on, that is, it also has ethical 
implications. If all right, a second cycle of the schema can start, granted that the 
researcher so wishes and freely.  
 
 
Emic/Etic Tension in CHC-based Research 
 
My main claim in the foregoing discussion on a prototypical Western research 
dynamics is that a research is inextricably a moral act insofar free agents intervene and 
act in each and every stage of it, and not only when, for example, researchers are 
working on the ethical committee clearance at institutional level. In this section, I 
examine its corollary: sui generis methodological problems in CHC-based research are 
related to or occur in the sphere of ethics. 
Among methodological issues in CHC-based Research, one deserves particular 
attention—interpretive intervention. When an interpretivist researcher does not belong 
to the culture in situ, s/he should be especially attentive wherever and whenever an 
interpersonal relationship occurs. Taylor and Waldrip (1999) suggested some practical 
advises to interpretivist research: A tightly organized initial contact with local 
participants; prolonged engagement and observation; understanding the connection 
between ownership of knowledge (information) and social hierarchy; validating 
interviews with careful triangulation; overcoming language barriers; and keeping the 
interview process sustainable by being aware of local culture, for example, gender-
related misunderstandings. Much earlier, John Berry suggested a three-stage 
adjustment for cross-cultural ethnography (1969): A first stage of determining 
functional equivalence on either side of cultures under study. A functional equivalence 
is a social behaviour which “has developed in response to a problem shared by two or 
more social/cultural groups, even though the behaviour in one society does not appear 
to be related to its counterpart in another society” (p. 122). Berry’s functional 
equivalence bears a resemblance to ‘dimensions of national cultures’ of Hofstede, who 
took cue from ethnographers who were contemporaries with Berry (1991, p. 13). Berry’s 
second and third stages of adjustment for cross-cultural ethnography are identifying 
                                            
3 Self-indulgence is not the same as akrasia, which is a dissociation of rational decision and will:  
a self-indulgent person is deliberately (prohairoumenos) led about [by his desires], 
accepting that ‘I should always pursue the pleasure that’s before me’; an akratic person 
in contrast does not accept this, yet he pursues it anyway. (Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics 1146b23-4) 
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descriptive categories (equivalent to taxonomy or rubrics in education) and creating an 
adequate measuring instrument.  
Conducting education research in CHC requires comparable demands in all 
interpersonal contact points, while high standards of fairness, trust and acceptance by 
locals are ensured. All translated research tools such as interview questionnaires, 
research instruments and inventories should enjoy reliability by verifying their internal 
consistency and stability in time (Banville, Desrosiers, & Genet-Volet, 2000; Behling & 
Law, 2000; Brislin, 1986; Vallerand, et al., 1992). CHC-based field research should 
ideally be in native language, assuming that any translations denote liability.  
The apologia for ‘outsider research’ by David Bridges (2001) takes a different 
approach to the problem. He rightly describes that an outside research could easily be 
stereotyped by insiders as intrusive, disrespectful and disempowering because “an 
outsider cannot understand or represent accurately a particular kind of experience” (p. 
372). But, he continues, outsider research can still contribute to understanding of all 
parties involved and inhibiting outsider research would only cause an epistemological 
and moral isolation (p. 381). He justifies outsider research by pointing out that 
experience of insider and its representation by outsider are simply different and none 
has special authority in validity (p. 374) and ends up by adding that an ideal condition 
for outsider research could be achieved by including cordiality, respect, openness to 
criticism and so on (p. 384). Although his diagnosis of the problem is correct, I disagree 
with Bridges’s proposed solution on two grounds. First, his conditions are plausible but 
they belong to the world of prospects and ideals, which cannot be naturalistically 
coherent and simplest (Ockham's razor) and, second, the chief problem that worries 
Bridges, namely emic/etic tension, needs a methodological solution and he does not 
address it. In my view, the core of methodological problems is the disparity between 
phenomenon as experienced and graphein (Gk. verb to write) and it lies in a strip 
between tentative theory stage and error elimination stage. The issue at point is how 
fairly the researcher represents the experiences. Take the case of children’s experience. 
We educationalists regard them as almost sacred because we know that they are unique, 
culturally permeated, immanent and non-transferable. When a researcher describes 
children’s experiences, it implies that sense-data undergo a second interpretive 
intervention (first being that of children’s) and this implies in turn an unavoidable 
distortion. Thomas Nagel (1974) pointed out an epistemological problem of mind-body 
theorization, suggesting that an alien experience, be it that of a bat or person, is 
incommensurable for outsiders, and that radical reductionists and physicalists cannot 
possibly articulate any credible epistemology apart from their own, and perhaps not 
even their own. A solution to this problem of disparity between phenomenon and 
graphein, in my view, is openly and systematically revealing the variation between the 
experience-description of research participants and the experience-description of the 
researcher. Indeed, this is the sort of gap that phenomenography has been trying to 
bridge for three decades in education (Marton, 1981) (Marton, 1988) (Pang, 2003). 
What is relevant to the present argument on research in and with CHC is not 
phenomenography qua pedagogical tool (Marton’s original project) but its use of 
variation as research methodology. Only an inclusion of variation factor can break the 
interpretive monopoly of researcher. Emi/etic variation comes into view through 
behaviour, which in turn depends significantly on culture. A CHC-based educational 
research should take into account the association between behavioural patterns and 
culture. When CHC students see a fish tank picture, for example, they attribute the 
movement of fish to the environment and other animals in the fish tank, whereas 
Western students attribute it to the fish themselves. Using similar experiments Nisbette 
et al. (2005; 2001) argued that significant variation exists between the two groups, 
which seems essential for data analysis in CHC-based research:    
 
East Asians [are more] holistic, attending to the entire field and assigning causality to it, 
making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on “dialectical” 
reasoning. Westerners are more analytic, paying attention primarily to the object and 
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the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal logic, to understand 
its behavior. (2001, p. 291) 
 
Empirical findings of Nisbette et al. suggest that CHC informs behaviour on the surface, 
at the same time that it informs underlying metaphysical categories (e.g., accident-
substance, essence-existence) and epistemological processes including believes and 
values. Jin Li’s empirical research findings (2002) somewhat corroborate Nisbette’s. 
CHC children’s belief on learning and their motivation to learn depend more on the 
culturally created plus valuation of te (德 virtues) such as diligence and personal effort 
rather than on Western model that values more talent, innate smartness and biological 
basis of intelligence. It is in this light that parental socialization appears as a powerful 
influence on CHC children’s educational values and attitudes, with epistemological 
consequences. In my view, research on CHC students should ideally include 
information/data from parents. 
 Solving the problem of disparity between phenomenon and graphein inherent 
to cross-cultural and international comparative education research won’t placate the 
emic-etic tension completely. The reason is that a phenomenon and graphein 
inequality presupposes an intrusion, cultural intrusion and disempowering, without 
actually solving it. And it is Freire who suggests a solution and candidly: 
 
“In cultural invasion the actors…superimpose themselves on the people, who are 
assigned the role of spectators, of objects. In cultural synthesis, the actors become 
integrated with the people, who are co-authors of the action that both perform upon 
the world” (1972, p. 147).   
 
 
The Possibility of an Asian Educational Research Methodology 
 
To conclude, for CHC-based education researches, neither Eastern nor Western 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks are to be dismissed in a Popperian error 
elimination fashion. They are not totally incommensurable à la Kuhn (1970), 
furthermore, they clearly share more in common than we would admit at first sight. 
The Confucian Heritage Culture as an academic discourse is relatively short. An ad 
hoc research methodology in and about CHC would be an impossible were it to attempt 
bypassing Western research rigor. Yet, Asian education research methodology in and 
about CHC could be recognized as a particularly nuanced methodology in education 
subject to certain conditionals:  
 
1. Adopted research problem and theoretical framework should not neglect to 
articulate a thick conception of CHC as opposed to a thin conception of it. 
Without it, calling nation-states by their names should be preferred over 
nicknaming and bundling them up as CHC; 
2. CHC-based research methodology issues are largely ethical issues that derive 
from interpersonal relationship among research actors. Education research 
without understanding re (Korean), li (Chinese) or shikata (Japanese) is 
likely to generate problems, such as low collaboration, unauthentic 
information, bilateral apprehension and avoidance; 
3. Any CHC-based research dynamics and Western research dynamics are not 
mutually exclusive. Ad casum methodological nuances should be addressed in 
a case-to-case basis;  
4. Asian education research methodology in and about CHC should ideally be a 
methodology that takes into account the phenomenographic variation 
between experience and description of educational realities, as well as the 
issue of ‘cultural invasion’.  
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